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Previous studies have argued that higher reference income not only triggers feelings of envy, 
but also serves to signal ambition and bright future prospects; the relative importance of envy 
(“comparison effect”) and ambition (“information effect”) depends on both the degree of 
mobility in one’s life stage and the reference group. Although the Japanese labor market and 
society are relatively immobile, individuals in the early part of their lives are more mobile and 
likely to have opportunities to change their career and residence than they will later in their 
lives. Thus, using a nationally representative individual-level data set from Japan, this study 
examined how reference income affects individual life satisfaction (LS) in both early and later 
life. We found that there was a significant negative association between LS and average income 
of the demographic reference group in the later life sample, but no association in the early 
life sample. Our findings suggest that the relative importance of comparison and information 
effects in Japan depend on the degree of mobility in one’s life stage; specifically, the information 
effect from ambition cancels out the comparison effect in early life, while the comparison effect 
dominates the information effect in later life.
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The relative income hypothesis, developed 
by Duesenberry (1949) and Friedman (1957), 
states that individuals evaluate their own 
income in comparison with the reference 
income, which is defined as the average 
income of one’s reference group.1 In other 
words, individual happiness is both positively 
affected by one’s own income and negatively 
affected by reference income. 
This relation between income and 
happiness has been the main subject of 
empirical studies (c.f., Frey and Stutzer 
2002). However, while individual income 
has been found to have a significantly 
positive effect on happiness, no studies 
have reached a consensus on how reference 
income affects individual utility. Rather, 
prior studies on the association between 
individual happiness and reference income 
have mixed results: Senik (2004), Shields, 
Price, and Wooden (2009), and Mangyo 
and Park (2011) find no association between 
happiness and reference income in Russia, 
Australia, and China, respectively, whereas 
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Luttmer (2005), Helliwell and Huang (2005), 
and Brown, Gray, and Roberts (2015) find 
a positive association between happiness 
and reference income in the United States, 
Canada, and the U.K. Additional studies, 
such as Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) 
in the United States and Clark, Westergård-
Nielsen, and Kristensen (2009) in Denmark, 
argue that there is a negative association 
between happiness and reference income.2 
Relative Importance of Comparison and 
Information Effects
Reference income may affect individual 
happiness in two ways (c.f., Senik 2004; 
Senik 2008; and FitzRoy et al. 2014). One 
is that higher reference income triggers a 
feeling of envy or jealousy, and thus has a 
negative effect on individual happiness. The 
other is that higher reference income serves 
as a signal of future prospects and thus has a 
positive effect on individual happiness. The 
former is referred to as the comparison effect, 
and the latter is referred to as the information 
effect.
To formalize the role of reference 
income, we introduce utility function, 
which provides a theoretical framework in 
economics; we presume that utility can serve 
as a proxy for happiness in this study. Suppose 
that individual utility depends on one’s own 
income Y, expected income E, and reference 
income RI. We assume that an individual’s 
expected income depends on the reference 
group’s observed income: E = E(RI). In short, 
it is presumed that as an individual observes 
a change in the income of people with similar 
characteristics, he/she expects this as a signal 
that his/her own income is going to change 
in the same way under uncertainty. Thus, an 
individual’s utility function can be expressed 
as:3
 U=V(Y,	E (RI ), RI ) [1]
It is clear that the marginal utility of Y is 
positive (∂V ⁄ ∂Y >0), as is the marginal utility 
of expected income E (∂V ⁄ ∂E >0). However, 
the marginal utility of reference income RI is 
ambiguous. The partial derivative of utility 
with respect to RI is:
 ∂U
∂RI
= ∂V
∂E
∂E
∂RI
+ ∂V
∂RI
 [2]
The first term of Equation [2], which 
represents the information effect of reference 
income on individual utility, is positive. 
As noted above, because the first part of 
this term, ∂V ⁄ ∂E, is the marginal utility of 
expected income E and positive, the second 
part of this term, ∂E ⁄ ∂RI, represents the effect 
of reference income on expected income (i.e., 
the information effect) and is also positive. 
There are two types of information effects, 
one from ambition and one from the area 
wealth effect (c.f., Brown et al. 2015). The 
information effect from ambition means that 
higher reference income serves as a signal of 
an individual’s higher own expected income 
(∂E ⁄ ∂RI >0). The information effect from 
the area wealth effect means that higher 
reference income serves as a signal of higher 
own expected income through better public 
services and security in the local community 
(∂E ⁄ ∂RI >0).4 On the other hand, the second 
term, ∂V ⁄ ∂RI represents the direct effect of RI 
on individual utility (i.e., comparison effect); 
this sign depends on how an individual feels 
about their reference group. If individual 
feelings are dominated by envy (as suggested 
by the relative income hypothesis), then this 
term will be negative. 
Hence the effect of an increase in 
reference income is unknown in advance 
and depends on the relative importance of 
the information and comparison effects. This 
suggests the need for an empirical examination 
of this term using regression analysis. If the 
coefficient of RI in our regression model is 
negative, then the comparison effect has 
more impact than the information effect. 
Conversely, if the coefficient of RI is positive, 
then the information effect dominates over 
the comparison effect. If the coefficient of 
RI is statistically nonsignificant, then the 
information and comparison effects offset 
each other. Of course, if the coefficient of RI 
is statistically nonsignificant, it is possible 
that both effects are too small to show up as 
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statistically significant.
One question about the relative 
importance of the comparison and 
information effects is which factors affect 
their relative importance. Senik (2008) finds 
that the relative importance of these effects 
depends on an individual’s degree of societal 
mobility.5 FitzRoy et al. (2014) argue that 
comparison effects are more prominent in 
individuals’ later life, while information 
effects dominate in one’s early life.6 This is 
because young individuals are more mobile 
and likely to interpret the reference group’s 
success as a signal that their position will 
improve soon. In other words, younger people 
see reference income not in comparison to 
their own income but rather as an information 
indicator of their own future prospects.
Another question about the relative 
importance of these two effects is how to 
define the reference group. Previous studies 
defined reference groups based on individual 
characteristics (“people like you”) and spatial 
groups (“people near you”). According to 
Brown et al. (2015), the positive coefficient 
becomes prominent in the latter case: they 
suggest that this is because individuals 
in wealthy areas enjoy better local public 
services and security, and refer to the 
information effect through the area wealth 
effect. In this study, we include both spatial 
groups (municipality7 where an individual 
lives) and demographic reference groups 
based on age (20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s) and 
gender.
Hypotheses
We hypothesize that there will be a negative 
relative income effect, as stated by the relative 
income hypothesis. Alternatively, reference 
income may be positively associated with 
happiness (c.f., Senik 2008; FitzRoy et al. 
2014; Brown and Gray 2016).
As mentioned above, we break the 
information effect into two kinds: the 
information effect from ambition and the 
information effect from the area wealth 
effect. We assume that for the demographic 
reference group, only the information effect 
from ambition will have an impact on 
happiness while for spatial reference groups, 
both the information effect from ambition and 
the information effect from the area wealth 
effect will have an impact. In other words, 
individuals will see the economic success of 
those who live near them as the increase of 
expected income through both ambition and 
high local public services. 
In addition, to examine whether the 
effect of reference income on individual 
happiness is affected by one’s mobility, 
we divided the entire sample into two sub-
samples based on age: “early life” and “later 
life.” We adopted two types of age categories 
for each life stage: ages 20–34 or 20–39 as 
the “early life” and ages 35–69 or 40–69 as 
the “later life.” 8 Because Japanese society 
and labor markets are immobile, individuals 
aged 40 or over have little hope for a bright 
future and opportunities to change their 
career and residence. 9 In other words, when 
individuals are younger, changing their career 
and residence is easier. If higher reference 
income serves as a signal of bright future 
prospects, then its impact should be greater 
for individuals in their early life. In short, 
the information effect has a greater impact 
on individuals in their early life than in their 
later life.
Therefore, we used the following three 
hypotheses to test how reference income 
affects individual utility.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association 
between happiness and the average income 
of people in the same demographic and 
spatial reference groups, because the 
information effect is likely to dominate the 
comparison effect in early life.
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative 
association between happiness and the 
average income of people in the same 
demographic and spatial reference groups, 
because the comparison effect is likely to 
dominate the information effect in later life.
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive or no 
association between happiness and the 
average income of people in the same 
spatial reference group, because both 
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the information effect through the area 
wealth effect and the information effect 
from ambition are likely to dominate or 
cancel out the comparison effect.
In this study, we used individual 
data from the 2015 Japanese International 
Comparative Survey on Lifestyle and Values, 
conducted by the Center for Social Well-being 
Studies at Senshu University.10 This was an 
online survey of respondents between the 
ages of 20 and 69 who were randomly chosen 
from a survey agent’s (Nikkei Research, 
Inc.) pre-registered monitors.11 Participants 
were randomly selected using 240 stratified 
categories constituted in proportion to 
the national distribution in regard to age, 
gender, city size, and region. Populations 
were sampled proportionately from 2010 
national census findings by gender, age, city 
scale, and region and were considered to be 
representative of Japan as a whole. There 
were 11,814 valid responses. 
METHODS
Model
The empirical analysis uses a subjective 
measure of life satisfaction (LS) as the proxy 
for individual happiness.12 To analyze the 
relative income hypothesis, we estimated 
individual LS function using an ordered logit 
regression:13
LSi* = α + ∑lq =1 βq Xiq + δYi +πRIi + φWij +ui
[3]
  0  if  -∞< LS* ≤ k1
  1  if   	k1  < LS* ≤ k2
LSi=  2  if    k2  < LS* ≤ k3
	 	⋮
 10  if   k10 < LS* < ∞
where LS* is a latent unobserved 
variable. LS is recorded on an 11-point 
Likert scale (10 = very satisfied, 0 = very 
unsatisfied) and has 10 thresholds over the 
latent variables. X is an individual-level 
variable, Y is an individual’s own income 
(equivalized income), RI is reference income, 
W is a vector of regional-level variables, u is 
the error term,14 and α, β, δ, π, φ, and the 10 
threshold values k are the parameters to be 
estimated. Moreover, i and j represent the 
individual and municipality, respectively.
Data
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction. We 
assessed subjective overall life satisfaction 
based on answers to the following question: 
“How satisfied are you currently with life 
overall?” In the survey, this variable is scored 
on an 11-point scale, from 0 (very unsatisfied) 
to 10 (very satisfied). The median and the 
mode of overall LS are 6 and 7, respectively.
Independent variables. The independent 
variables were individual attributes, 
municipality size, individual income, and 
reference income. Individual attributes 
included age, gender, marital status, 
housing status, educational attainments, and 
occupational status. Our data included male 
and female Japanese residents between 20 
and 69 years old. Among all respondents, 
48.6% were female. The mean age was about 
46 years old. Marital status was categorized 
into married, unmarried, and divorced 
(including widowed). In all, 64.7% of the 
respondents were married and 67.9% were 
homeowners. Educational attainment was 
categorized into high school degree or lower 
(25.0％ of respondents), some college or 
associate degree (vocational school, junior 
college, vocational high school: 21.6％ of 
respondents), and university or higher (53.5% 
of respondents). Occupational statuses 
were categorized into regular employees 
(company executives, permanent employees, 
and civil servants: 42.2% of respondents), 
non-regular employees (part-time workers, 
temporary staff, contract workers, and fixed-
term staff: 19.5% of respondents), self-
employed and family employees (9.0%), 
unemployed (2.4%), and non-workers (the 
retired, homemakers, and students: 26.9%). 
Municipality size was controlled using 
a regional-level variable (towns and villages, 
small cities [population < 200,000], medium-
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables
Variables 　 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Life Satisfaction 5.922 2.383 0 10
Age 　 46.105 13.599 20 69
Gender [Male] 0.514 0.500 0 1
Female 0.486 0.500 0 1
Marital Status [Married] 0.646 0.478 0 1
Divorced 0.062 0.242 0 1
Unmarried 0.291 0.454 0 1
Home Ownership [Renter] 0.321 0.467 0 1
Owner 0.679 0.467 0 1
Occupational  Status [Regular] 0.423 0.494 0 1
Non regular 0.195 0.396 0 1
Unemployed 0.024 0.153 0 1
Retired 0.269 0.444 0 1
Self employed 0.090 0.286 0 1
Educational Attainment [High school degree or lower] 0.250 0.433 0 1
Some college or associate degree 0.216 0.411 0 1
University or higher 0.535 0.499 0 1
Municipality Size [Town and Village] 0.082 0.275 0 1
Small cities 0.373 0.484 0 1
Medium-sized cities 0.251 0.433 0 1
20 Major cities 0.294 0.456 0 1
Own Income 　 407.142 286.793 17.7 3,260
Reference Income Municipality 149.756 45.646 56.2 548.5
Age and Gender 396.481 144.796 209.3 661.6
Note: Unit of income: 10 thousand yen.  Reference is shown in brackets.
sized cities [population 200,000–700,000], 
and 20 major cities [population > 700,000]).15
Household income was categorized 
into 25 income segments ranging from under 
500,000 yen a year to 20,000,000 yen or 
more a year. For individual’s own income, 
we adopted an equivalized income calculated 
by dividing household income16 by the square 
root of household size. As noted above, we 
used two types of reference groups. The 
average income of spatial reference groups 
was determined from the mean personal 
income in each municipality in 2015.17 The 
average income of demographic reference 
groups was determined as the mean annual 
income of each age and gender group in 
2015.18
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics 
for LS, individual-level variables, regional-
level variables, and income variables. The 
sample included 10,416 respondents living in 
1,162 municipalities19 across the nation.
RESULTS
We performed ordered logit regression with 
overall LS as the dependent variable.20 All 
models included all individual and regional 
variables, allowing us isolate the association 
between LS and income after controlling for 
all variables, as shown in Equation 3. Model A 
uses individuals living in the same municipal 
area as the spatial reference group. Model B 
uses individuals with the same gender and 
age as the demographic reference group. In 
addition, to examine the relative importance 
of the comparison and information effects at 
different stages in life (Hypotheses 1 and 2), 
we divided the entire sample into two sub-
samples: “early life” and “later life.” We 
then defined Model 1 as including the entire 
sample, Model 2 as including the “early life” 
sample, and Model 3 as including the “later 
life” sample. The empirical results are shown 
in Table 2. 
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Individual attributes. These results 
regarding individual attributes were generally 
as expected; overall LS was affected by 
certain individual attributes. For example, 
LS and age showed a U-shape association. 
The LS of individuals between ages 45 and 
50 was rather low. Women reported higher 
LS than men. Unmarried and divorced 
individuals reported lower satisfaction than 
married people. Homeowners reported 
higher satisfaction than renters. Individuals 
with junior college or vocational school 
degrees, and undergraduate or postgraduate 
degrees reported higher satisfaction than 
other groups. Non-regular employees and 
unemployed individuals reported lower 
satisfaction than regular employees.
Municipal-level variables. We found no 
associations between municipality size and 
LS in any model.
Comparison Effect vs. Information Effect
Our findings regarding the reference group 
were contradictory. First, the empirical results 
from the spatial reference group (Model 
A-1 in Table 2a) showed no significant 
associations between LS and average income 
of the spatial reference group. However, 
the empirical results from the demographic 
reference group (Model B-1 in Table 2b) 
showed a negative association between LS 
and average income among individuals of the 
same age and gender at the 1% significance 
level, and the comparison effect dominated 
the information effect. 
The sub-samples showed similar 
contradictory findings. First, the empirical 
results from the spatial reference group 
(Models A-2 and A-3 in Table 2a) showed 
no association between LS and municipal 
average income. For the demographic 
reference group (Models B-2 and B-3 in 
Table 2b), the empirical results for the 35–
69 and 40–69 age groups showed negative 
associations between LS and average income 
among individuals in the same age and 
gender group at the 1% significance level. 
However, empirical results for the 20–34 
and 20–39 age groups showed no association 
between LS and average income among 
individuals in the same age and gender group. 
These results suggest that the information 
effect has a greater impact on individuals 
in their early life than in their later life; the 
information effect from ambition cancels out 
the comparison effect in early life. However, 
another possibility is that the effect of 
reference income is nonsignificant because 
both effects were originally very small and 
nonsignificant, rather than because of the 
cancellation.
Evaluation of Marginal Effects: Own 
Income vs. Reference Income
In the previous section, our empirical results 
indicated that higher own income increases 
one’s LS while higher demographic reference 
income decreases one’s LS in later life. To 
examine how increases in both individual’s 
own income and reference income affect one’s 
LS in later life, we compared the marginal 
effects of own income with reference income 
obtained from ordered logit estimation 
results. A marginal effect measures the 
change in probability of LS = m for a change 
in the independent variable xl. According to 
Long and Freese (2014), discrete change is 
the change in the probability of LS = m for 
change in xl from the start value to the end 
value, holding all other variables constant. 
For example, a discrete change is the change 
in the probability of LS = m for a change in 
any amount (such as 1 million yen) of income, 
holding all other variables constant. Thus, we 
used discrete change in our analysis.
The average discrete change (ADC) is 
the mean of the discrete change calculated 
at the observed values for all observations in 
the sample:
 ADC = ∑ ( | ) [4]
Here, m = 0, …,10. ADC implies, on 
average, that a discrete change in xl increases 
the probability of LS = m by z percentage 
points. 21 
Table 3 shows how increases in both 
one’s own and reference income affect the 
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Table 3. Average Discrete Change (ADC) of Increased Income
(Unit: %, percentage point)
Sample LS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 LS≥7
Entire Pr(LS) 3.3 1.9 4.2 7.3 7.2 16.7 12.8 17.8 17.5 6.5 4.8 46.6
Entire ⊿ Pr/⊿ Y –0.8 –0.4 –0.9 –1.3 –1.0 –1.6 –0.4 0.8 2.6 1.6 1.4 6.4
⊿ Pr/⊿ RI 0.7 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.1 –0.8 –1.8 –0.9 –0.8 –4.3
Age 35–69 ⊿ Pr/⊿ Y –0.8 –0.4 –0.9 –1.3 –1.1 –1.8 –0.5 0.7 2.9 1.8 1.5 6.9
⊿ Pr/⊿ RI 1.4 0.7 1.4 2.0 1.5 1.8 0.1 –1.7 –3.8 –1.9 –1.5 –8.9
Age 40–69 ⊿ Pr/⊿ Y –0.7 –0.4 –0.9 –1.3 –1.1 –1.7 –0.6 0.6 2.9 1.8 1.5 6.8
⊿ Pr/⊿ RI 1.7 0.8 1.7 2.4 1.7 2.1 0.1 –2.0 –4.6 –2.3 –1.7 –10.6
Entire Difference 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 2.1
Age 35–69 Difference –0.6 –0.3 –0.5 –0.7 –0.4 0.0 0.4 –1.0 –0.9 –0.1 0.0 –2.0
Age 40–69 Difference –1.0 –0.4 –0.8 –1.1 –0.6 –0.4 0.5 –1.4 –1.7 –0.5 –0.2 –3.8
Note: LS: Life Satisfaction, Y: Own Income, RI: Reference income. 
 Pr(LS): Predicted probability of choosing LS = m, Unit: %. 
 ∆Pr/∆Y: Marginal effect of predicted probability for 2.5-million-yen increase in own income, Unit: percentage point.
 ∆Pr/∆RI: Marginal effect of predicted probability for 2.5-million-yen increase in reference income, 
 Unit: percentage point. 
 Difference: |∆Pr/∆Y|－ |∆Pr/∆RI|, Unit: point.
predicted probability on the basis of the 
estimation result from Model B.22 Because 
the median value of LS was 6, we adopted 
LS = 7 as the threshold of relatively higher 
satisfaction. For the entire sample (Model 
B-1), a 2.5 million yen increase (about 
$20,000 [$1 = \120]) in own income increased 
the probability of choosing 7 and over by 
6.4 percentage points (∆Pr(LS ≥ 7)/∆Y). On 
the other hand, a 2.5 million yen increase in 
reference income decreased the probability 
of choosing 7 and over by 4.3 percentage 
points (∆Pr(LS ≥ 7)/∆RI). Among those 
between the ages of 35–69 (Model B-3), 
a 2.5 million yen increase in own income 
increased the probability of choosing 7 and 
over (LS	≥ 7) by 6.9 percentage points. On 
the other hand, a 2.5 million yen increase in 
reference income decreased the probability 
of choosing 7 and over (LS ≥ 7) by 8.9 
percentage points. Among those between 
the ages of 40–69 (Model B-3), a 2.5 million 
yen increase in own income increased the 
probability of choosing 7 and over (LS ≥ 7) 
by 6.8 percentage points. On the other hand, a 
2.5 million yen increase in reference income 
decreased the probability of choosing 7 and 
over (LS ≥ 7) by 10.9 percentage points.
In Table 3, “difference” represents 
the difference (i.e., (|∆Pr/∆Y|–|∆Pr/∆RI|) 
between absolute value of marginal effect 
of the predicted probability for increase in 
an individual’s own income (|∆Pr/∆Y|) and 
marginal effect of the predicted probability 
for increase in reference income (|∆Pr/∆RI|). 
When “difference” is positive, then the 
marginal effect of increase in own income is 
larger than the marginal effect of increase in 
reference income (i.e. |∆Pr/∆Y | > |∆Pr/∆RI|). 
Inversely, when “difference” is negative, then 
the marginal effect of increase in reference 
income is larger than the marginal effect 
of increase in own income (i.e., |∆Pr/∆Y| 
< |∆Pr/∆RI|). The “difference” of the entire 
sample was positive. On the other hand, the 
“difference” of the later life sub-sample was 
negative (for example, the probability of 
choosing high LS (Pr(LS ≥ 7) was –2.0 point 
in age 35–69 and –3.8 point in age 40–69 
sub-samples), which means that the marginal 
effect of an increase in reference income is 
larger than the marginal effect of an increase 
in own income as one ages.23
CONCLUSIONS
While the relative income hypothesis states 
that higher reference income triggers a feeling 
of envy and thus has a negative effect on 
individual happiness, empirical studies have 
not yet reached a consensus on how reference 
income affects individual happiness. Thus, in 
this study, we distinguished the information 
effect from the comparison effect and 
examined which factors affect the relative 
importance of comparison and information 
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effects using Japanese nationwide survey data 
from 2015. Our main findings are as follows. 
First, our empirical findings from the “later 
life” sample (ages 35–69 or 40–69) show a 
negative association between LS and average 
income of the demographic reference group. 
On the other hand, our empirical results from 
the “early life” sample (ages 20–34 or 20–39) 
show no association between LS and average 
income of the demographic reference group. 
These results indicate that the information 
effect from ambition cancels out the 
comparison effect in one’s early life, while the 
comparison effect dominates the information 
effect in one’s later life. In short, these results 
indicate that individuals in later life envy 
the increased income of their demographic 
reference group, while young individuals are 
more mobile and more likely to be ambitious 
when faced with the increased income of their 
demographic reference group. Consequently, 
our results partially support Hypothesis 1 and 
fully support Hypothesis 2.24
Second, our empirical results show no 
significant associations between LS and 
the average income of the spatial reference 
group. This result is consistent with Brown et 
al. (2015). This suggests that the information 
effect from both the area wealth effect and 
ambition canceled out the comparison effect. 
Therefore, our results support Hypothesis 3.25
Third, we found that among those in the 
“later life” sample, the marginal effect of an 
increase in reference income is larger than the 
marginal effect of an increase in individual 
own income. Individuals in their later life 
have faced severe employment reduction 
under Japan’s long-term economic slump that 
began in the early 1990s. Thus, they may be 
more likely to feel jealousy at the economic 
success of their peers. However, further 
research is needed to provide a more detailed 
explanation of this larger comparison effect 
in one’s later life.
Our contribution to the study of 
happiness is that we verified the relative 
importance of comparison and information 
effects depending on the degree of mobility 
in life stage in Japan. This is consistent with 
results of previous international studies 
such as Senik (2008) and FitzRoy et al. 
(2014). In addition, our results imply that the 
estimations of reference income across all 
age samples make the mistake of interpreting 
the relative importance of comparison and 
information effects. 
Further research remains to be done. 
There is still no consensus as to which spatial 
reference groups have the most influence on 
individual happiness. Our results indicated 
that the information effect canceled out the 
comparison effect when municipality was 
adopted as the reference group. For example, 
this study could not examine prefectures as the 
spatial reference groups. Likewise, the effect 
of average prefectural income might depend 
on the relative importance of the information 
and comparison effects. Individuals might 
see an increase in average prefectural income 
as a signal of their own future prospects; 
benefits from the improvement of a local 
economy are not limited to a small area such 
as municipality but are spread across a wide 
area. On the other hand, the area wealth 
effect of a prefecture might be weak, because 
prefectural services are not closely related 
to residents’ daily lives.26 This issue must be 
addressed in the future.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the MEXT-Supported Program 
for the Strategic Research Foundation at Private Universities 
of Japan, 2014-2018 (S1491003). “International Comparative 
Surveys on Lifestyle and Values” were designed and conducted 
by the Center for Social Well-being Studies, Institute for the 
Development of Social Intelligence, Senshu University, Japan, 
in collaboration with Social Well-being Research Consortium in 
Asia.
Notes
1. The reference group is the set of relevant others to which 
individuals compare themselves; it is defined based on 
geographic location and demographic characteristics such as 
age, gender, and education.
2. Previous empirical studies in Japan of the relative income 
hypothesis examined the relationship between individual 
happiness and the Gini coefficient, which indicates income 
inequality in one’s prefecture or municipality (e.g., Oshio 
and Kobayashi 2009; Oshio and Kobayashi 2011; Inaba et 
al. 2015; Sumi 2016). However, no Japanese studies have 
determined the effect of income inequality according to 
one’s place of residence. See Sumi (2016) for more detailed 
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information.
3. See Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) and Senik (2008) for 
more information.
4. For example, if high-level public education in the local 
community provides residents high income earning 
opportunities, better public services are likely to increase 
individuals’ expected income.
5. Senik (2008) examined how subjective well-being depends 
on both individual and reference income and found that 
information effects dominate in transitioning European 
countries and the United States, both of which have high 
social mobility, while comparison effects are dominant in 
stable European countries with low social mobility (such as 
the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, etc.).
6. FitzRoy et al. (2014) found positive effects of reference 
income on happiness for those under 45 and negative effects 
for those over 45 in Germany and the UK.
7. Alternatively, individual utility might be affected by a 
prefecture’s average income. There is no consensus as to the 
spatial group that has an influence on individual happiness. 
Further research is needed to examine the association 
between happiness and average prefectural income.
8. As a reference, it is generally believed that a critical period 
for career change in the Japanese labor market is around age 
35. To check the robustness of age categories in early life and 
later life, we adopted two types of age categories for each 
life stage.
9. According to analysis of the Japanese-style employment 
system in 2011 by Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
(Analysis of the Labor Economy 2015), Japanese male 
workers aged 35–54 had the most seniority among main 
OECD countries (such as continental European counties and 
the United States), while Japanese male workers aged 15–34 
had the average length of service among these countries. 
These data indicate that long-term employment practices 
still show little change and lower social mobility in later life 
in Japan. On the other hand, Japanese female workers aged 
40–69 had relatively short-term seniority among the main 
OECD countries. This was because many females in this age 
group left their jobs because of childbirth and childcare and 
did not return to work. This also indicates female’s low social 
mobility in later life in Japan.
10. Senshu University Center for Social Well-being Studies 
(2014–2018), led by Hiroo Harada, is conducting the 
International Comparative Survey on Lifestyle and Values to 
facilitate large-scale systematic exploration of determinants 
of well-being. Surveys have been completed in Japan 
(February 2015), South Korea (summer 2015), Vietnam 
(autumn 2015), the Philippines (autumn 2016), Thailand 
(winter 2016), and Indonesia and Taiwan (2017). In this 
study, we analyze findings from the February 2015 survey 
in Japan.
11. The survey consisted of four main categories: 32 questions 
on social well-being, 10 questions on social capital, eight on 
risk, and six on social networks.
12. Responses to the standard life satisfaction question, “How 
satisfied are you currently with overall life?” are used to 
measure happiness (c.f., Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Goerke 
and Pannenberg 2015).
13. An ordered logit/probit estimation was also used by 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Helliwell and Huang 
(2005), and Shields et al. (2009). This method is appropriate 
where the dependent variable has more than two categories 
and the values of each category have a meaningful sequential 
order where one value is higher than the previous one.
14. In the ordered logit model, u is logistically distributed with 
F(z) = ez / (1+ez).
15. These are formally government-designated cities with 
populations over 500,000. All 20 major cities had populations 
over 700,000 in 2015.
16. Median values are used as reference values for all segments, 
except for the group who earned 20,000,000 yen or more, for 
which 32,600,000 yen is used. According to the Statistical 
Survey of Actual Status of Salary in the Private Sector, 
conducted by the National Tax Agency, the average income 
of those who earn 20,000,000 yen or more was 32,600,000 
yen in 2015.
17. Taxable income data do not include income earned by those 
whose income falls below the exemption limits, a category 
that accounts for almost 40% of income earners in Japan. 
The proportion of non-taxpayers in a region might differ 
slightly between regions, but in this analysis the differences 
are disregarded for the sake of simplicity.
18. Data on annual taxable personal income of municipality 
were derived from “Taxation Trends in the Municipal Tax” 
(Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). Data 
on annual personal income by gender and age were derived 
from the “Statistical Survey of Actual Status for Salary in the 
Private Sector” (National Tax Agency).
19. In 2015, there were 1,741 Japanese municipalities. Our 
sample covered 66.7% of these. 
20. The null hypothesis of the log likelihood ratio chi-square 
(LRχ2) test that all predictor variables do not contribute to the 
model was rejected in all models.
21. Another measure of marginal effect is a discrete change in 
mean (MDC). The MDC was computed for all variables held 
at their means (MDC = ∆Pr (LSi = m|X , xl = xl / ∆xl ). 
22. For example, a 2.5 million yen increase in an individual’s 
own income decreased the probability of choosing 5 (LS = 
5) by 1.6 percentage points and increased the probability 
of choosing 8 (LS = 8) by 2.6 percentage points. On the 
other hand, a 2.5 million yen increase in reference income 
significantly decreased the probability of choosing 8 (LS = 
8) by 1.8 percentage points and increased the probability of 
choosing 3 (LS = 3) by 1.0 percentage points, on average.
23. Any increase in the amount of income, such as 1.25 million 
yen (about 10,000 dollar) had the same marginal effect.
24. To assume that the insignificant effect means cancellation of 
the comparison effect by the information effect, we need to 
rigorously show that information and comparison effect have 
independently positive and negative effects on LS. Further 
research is needed to examine these effect.
25. However, as noted above, there is another possibility: the 
effect of reference income is insignificant because both 
effects are originally very small and insignificant, not 
because of the cancellation.
26. In Japan, prefectures provide local public services covering 
a broader area and coordinate affairs among municipalities. 
For example, prefectures are responsible for police, high 
schools, road networks, etc. 
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